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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Millions of Americans are now required to give up their right
to take their employers to court in order to get a job. Thousands of
employers require new employees to “agree” to take any legal
dispute that may arise to private arbitration. The Supreme Court
† President, National Workrights Institute; former Director of the National
Taskforce on Civil Liberties in the Workplace, ACLU; member of Blue Ribbon
Committee that wrote the Due Process Protocol for Arbitration of Statutory
Employment Disputes; Advisor, Revised Uniform Arbitration Act; Board of
Directors for the American Arbitration Association. Special thanks to my research
assistant, Rebecca MacDonald, J.D., Rutgers Law School, 2003, for her help in
conducting the research for this article.
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has not only approved such agreements, but has done so without
requiring that arbitration be fair.
Civil rights advocates strongly oppose mandatory arbitration
and argue that agreements to arbitrate should only be enforceable
when made after a dispute has arisen. Congress is considering
legislation that would outlaw pre-dispute employment arbitration
agreements.
This report examines the likely impact of this proposed law
and finds that it would harm the employees it is intended to help.
Analysis of data from the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) reveals that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes are rare, despite the widespread availability of
this option. Only about 6% of all employment arbitration comes
from post-dispute agreements.
This would not change if the law were reformed to eliminate
an employer’s ability to force employees into arbitration.
Examination of business-to-business arbitration, where both parties
generally have comparable bargaining power, shows that only 9%
of AAA arbitration of such disputes arises from post-dispute
agreements.
Interviews with management attorneys reveal the reasons for
this scarcity. Many employers are willing to agree to arbitrate all
cases on a pre-dispute basis in order to avoid a jury trial on the
handful of cases that could result in multimillion dollar judgments.
Once the dispute arises, however, employers generally have no
incentive to arbitrate the run-of-the-mill dispute. For example,
95% of the management attorneys we interviewed said they would
not agree to arbitrate a dispute in which they could obtain
summary judgment from a court. Since courts resolve 60% of all
employment cases through summary judgment for the employer,
this factor alone eliminates the possibility of a post-dispute
agreement to arbitrate in slightly over half of all cases. Other
management attorneys are reluctant to arbitrate when the
employee does not have the financial means to pursue litigation, or
for a variety of other reasons.
This evidence indicates that most employees will not be able to
secure their employer’s agreement to arbitrate once the dispute
arises. The vast majority of employment disputes, however, do not
involve enough damages to support contingent fee litigation.
Therefore, outlawing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate will leave
many employees with no access to justice.
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This does not mean that we must accept arbitration as a
condition of employment. Rather, we should allow pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate, but require that such agreements be
voluntary. Unofficial coercion could be avoided in such situations
by giving employees the choice of dispute resolution systems after
they have started work and keeping the decision in a confidential
file, unavailable to line managers. Employers could also adopt a
default policy of arbitrating disputes but allow the employee to opt
out before the dispute arises.
II. INTRODUCTION
Employment arbitration today is a unilateral decision made by
management. The vast majority of employers who use arbitration
require employees to “agree” to waive their right to a jury trial or
1
lose their jobs.
This does not automatically mean that employees do not
receive justice. At least since the development of consensus due
2
process standards, empirical research has found that arbitration
decisions from the American Arbitration Association compare
3
favorably to those of federal courts. Employment arbitration
providers, however, are not legally required to comply with these
standards. The lack of required standards leaves many employees
in the position of being contractually required to submit to
arbitration under conditions that even employers agree are unfair.
Additionally, even if all providers met the due process standards,
compulsory arbitration would not be right. No one should be
forced to waive a constitutional right as a condition of employment,
even if no tangible harm is done.
Employment rights advocates have fought this trend, largely
unsuccessfully. Their arguments have been made forcefully and
4
articulately by many, including the author. Having twice failed to
1. Interview with Robert Meade, Vice President, American Arbitration
Association (Jan. 31, 2003).
2. BNA, PROTOTYPE AGREEMENT ON JOB BIAS DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 1995 DAILY
LAB. REP. NO. 91 D-34 (1995).
3. Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2003); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 46 (1998).
4. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 M CGEORGE L. REV.
223 (1998); Lewis L. Maltby, Paradise Lost—How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
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persuade the Supreme Court that condition of employment
5
arbitration is improper, opponents of mandatory arbitration have
turned to Congress. Employee rights advocates have persuaded
members of Congress to introduce legislation that would abolish
6
arbitration as a condition of employment.
But what are the alternatives? If we are not to have arbitration
as a condition of employment, what will take its place?
The majority of the plaintiffs’ employment bar and civil rights
attorneys argue that agreements to arbitrate should only be
enforceable under two conditions:
A. The Agreement Is Voluntary

7

Voluntary, in this context, means both parties truly prefer to
arbitrate the dispute, rather than take it to court. Voluntary does
not mean an employee who would prefer to litigate accepts
arbitration because it is a condition of employment.
8

B. The Agreement to Arbitrate Is Made After the Dispute Arises

The argument in support of this requirement comes from
fundamental law regarding waiver of constitutional rights. A
9
waiver, to be valid, must be both knowing and voluntary. “How
can an agreement to waive one’s right to resolve a dispute by jury
trial be knowing,” the plaintiffs’ bar argues, “when the employee
knows nothing about the dispute because it hasn’t even arisen?”

for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1
(1994); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
5. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
6. Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d105/d105laws.html (last visited Aug. 17,
2003).
7. Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1203, 1216 (2002).
8. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’ N, POLICY STATEMENT ON
M ANDATORY ARBITRATION, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2003); see also
Patricia Ireland, President of National Organization of Women, Testimony before
a committee of the National Association of Securities Dealers (June 1997),
available at http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/nasd-testimony.html (last visited Aug.
17, 2003).
9. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
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The only way an employee can know the facts and circumstances of
the dispute, in order to make a knowing waiver, is after the dispute
has arisen.
Enforcing only voluntary, post-dispute arbitration sounds
wonderful, at least to the ears of a civil rights lawyer like myself.
But would such a rule work in practice? Proponents of the rule
assume, often unconsciously, that employers who currently insist on
arbitration agreements before the dispute arises will be equally
eager to sign such agreements after the dispute arises.
This may not be true. An employer’s incentives regarding
arbitrating an undifferentiated group of future disputes are quite
different than an employer’s incentives regarding a specific dispute
whose contours are known. When a company considers all its
future employment disputes, it sees a black hole that may contain a
wide variety of financial risks. On the one extreme are disputes
where the potential liability is too small for the employee to afford
to litigate the case. A great many cases fall into this category. A
1995 survey of plaintiff employment lawyers found that an
employee needed to have a minimum of $60,000 in provable
damages, not including pain and suffering or punitive damages,
10
before an attorney would take the case. With inflation, that figure
has probably increased to at least $80,000. At the other extreme,
the future may contain a dispute that could anger a jury to the
point of rendering a multibillion dollar punitive damage award that
could bankrupt even a large company. Faced with this situation,
many employers are willing to agree in advance to arbitrate
everything. They are willing to create a risk of liability in many
cases they could have otherwise ignored in order to decrease the
11
risk of a ruinous punitive damages award.
The situation after the dispute arises is far different. The
employer now knows whether the magnitude of the employee’s
damages, and their likelihood of prevailing at trial, enable the
employee to obtain counsel and litigate the dispute. Where the
10. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DISP.
RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 44.
11. The accuracy of employers’ perception that arbitrators are less willing
than jurors to award punitive damages is subject to debate. Unpublished
empirical research has found little difference between the behavior of jurors and
arbitrators when it comes to punitive damages. It is not all punitive damage
awards, however, that employers are trying to avoid, only those that are large
enough to cause the company catastrophic financial harm. Many management
lawyers believe that these awards come primarily from juries.
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employer knows that the employee has no credible threat of suing,
the employer has no incentive to arbitrate. More precisely, it is in
the employer’s best interest to refuse to arbitrate. Thus, it is
possible that if the law were changed to allow only post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate, the result would be that employees with
12
smaller claims would be denied access to justice completely.
This issue has been raised by other legal scholars. Professor
Samuel Estreicher argues that employee-plaintiffs (and their
counsel) will only be willing to arbitrate cases in which arbitration
13
gives them a competitive advantage. Employers will only arbitrate
14
when the opposite is true. Thus, mutual post-dispute agreement
15
to arbitrate will be inherently rare. This conclusion is supported
by Kritzer’s work, showing that plaintiffs’ lawyers are rational actors
who only accept cases in which they believe the likely fee will
16
profitably compensate them for the hours of work required.
David Sherwyn of Cornell reaches the same conclusion by surveying
plaintiff and defense attorneys regarding their inclination to
17
arbitrate in three different employment dispute scenarios. In no
scenario did plaintiff and defense lawyers agree that arbitration was
18
the best way to resolve the dispute. Plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that
employers’ willingness to arbitrate would not be affected by the
adoption of a “post-dispute only” rule.
Most of these discussions, however, have been theoretical. In
order to reach conclusions, these theories must be confirmed by
empirical data. This article will provide an empirical test.

12. I first raised this issue in a 1998 article; see Maltby, supra note 3, at 56-58.
13. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563
(2001).
14. Id. at 567.
15. Id. at 567-68.
16. HERBERT KRITZER, INST. FOR LEGAL STUDIES, RHETORIC AND REALITY . . .
USES AND ABUSES . . . CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT
FEE IN OPERATION 9 (1996).
17. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration
Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law
Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 57 (2003). The first scenario
“involves the classic ‘he said, she said’ factual situation.” Id. at 51. The second
scenario involves facts that are “intended to evoke pro-employee sympathy” but
“legal analysis . . . favors the employer.” Id. at 53. Finally, the third scenario facts
intended “to lead the parties to believe . . . the court would grant the [employer’s]
dispositive motion.” Id. at 56.
18. Id. at 57.
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III. CURRENT FREQUENCY OF POST-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS TO
ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
The most direct way to evaluate employers’ willingness to
arbitrate post-dispute is to examine the frequency with which they
do it now. We conducted this examination by analyzing the
records of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). We
reviewed the files of 312 AAA employment arbitrations for the year
2001 to determine when the parties made the agreement to
19
arbitrate.
In the majority of cases, this information was not
present. However, for seventy-three cases the timing of the
agreement to arbitrate was indicated in the case file. In fifty-eight
of these cases (79%), the agreement to arbitrate was made prior to
the dispute, almost always at the time of employment. In only
fifteen cases (21%) the agreement to arbitrate was made after the
dispute arose.
Timing of Agreement to Arbitrate
Pre-Dispute
Post-Dispute
79%
21%
After we completed our manual review of individual files, the
AAA increased the data retrieval capabilities of their computer
system. At our request, AAA staff conducted a computerized
analysis of their entire 2001 and 2002 caseload to determine the
frequency of post-dispute arbitration agreements.
This analysis indicated that post-dispute agreements are even
more rare. AAA found only 6% (69/1148) of their 2001
employment arbitrations were the result of post-dispute
agreements. In 2002, the frequency of post-dispute agreements was
20
even lower, 2.6% (29/1124).
Frequency of Post-dispute Agreements
2001
2002
6%
2.6%
It is impossible to say with certainty which of these results

19. This represents the total number of paper files of 2001 employment
disputes located in the New York office of AAA.
20. Letter from Ryan Boyle, staff, AAA, to author (Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with
author).
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presents a more accurate picture of post-dispute agreements in
employment arbitration. The fact that AAA’s investigation involved
their entire caseload suggests that the 2001 figure is closer to 6%
than the 21% of the paper files.
There is also confusion in classifying individual cases as pre- or
post-dispute agreements. For example, an arbitration is frequently
initiated by a letter from a lawyer for one of the parties. Such a
letter often states that the decision to arbitrate was by agreement of
the parties. This appears to be a post-dispute agreement. In some
cases, however, the parties have “agreed” to arbitrate because a
judge has rejected a challenge by the employee to the
enforceability of a pre-dispute agreement. Unless the court order
is included with the letter, it is impossible for the person classifying
the case to know when the agreement was made.
In most cases, the employee’s attorney will not want this
information disclosed to AAA and the arbitrator, and the
employer’s attorney will go along with this omission. Even if the
court order is included in the submission to AAA, it is likely that
the case administrator (or our researcher) may not make the
correct conclusion. There are many additional ways in which a
21
dispute submitted to AAA may disguise its true origin. In most, if
not all, of these situations, the result is that a pre-dispute
agreement is mistakenly classified as a post-dispute agreement.
Even if one could resolve the correct percentage of postdispute agreements for 2001, there remains the significant
difference between AAA’s numbers for 2001 and 2002. After
consultation with AAA staff, I estimate the frequency of postdispute arbitration at approximately 6% for 2002.
The infrequency of post-dispute agreements indicates
employers are generally unwilling to arbitrate once a claim has
arisen and its specifics are known. This does not bode well for the
ability of employees to obtain access to justice if only post-dispute
voluntary agreements to arbitrate are enforceable.
One might challenge this implication by arguing that postdispute agreements are rare because there is little opportunity for
them today. Employers who use arbitration almost always make it a
condition of employment. If employers were not allowed to force
employees into arbitration as a condition of employment, the
21. Another reason a dispute may be characterized incorrectly is if the parties
submit the dispute for arbitration by mutual agreement and the basis for their
agreement is a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate.
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argument goes, many more disputes would result in post-dispute
agreements.
This argument might be persuasive if employment arbitration
clauses were universal. This, however, is not the case. While the
frequency of arbitration clauses in standard employment
agreements has increased dramatically in recent years, the vast
22
majority of employers still do not use them. There is ample
opportunity for the employers who do not use such arrangements
to agree to arbitration after disputes arrive. Employers simply do
not take advantage of this opportunity.
It is also possible that these lopsided numbers may be
symptomatic of the peculiar nature of employment arbitration
today. The classic model of arbitration involves two parties
mutually and voluntarily agreeing to resolve their dispute(s)
(current or future) through arbitration rather than litigation. The
parties also mutually agree upon who the arbitrator will be and the
rules under which he or she will operate. This model has little
similarity with current arbitration, in which the employer makes
virtually all the decisions. While it is difficult to explain why these
changes have resulted in a dearth of post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate, nothing should be ruled out in such a distorted situation.
IV. FREQUENCY OF POST-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
DISPUTES BETWEEN BUSINESSES
Rather than argue about the arcane ways in which the power
imbalances in today’s employment arbitration might lead to the
lack of voluntary post-dispute agreements, I chose to eliminate this
variable from the analysis by examining another arbitration context
where it does not exist. In business-to-business arbitration, there is
generally rough equality of bargaining power. One seldom, if ever,
hears complaints of arbitration clauses being forced upon small
corporations by a more powerful business associate. If inequality of
bargaining power is responsible for the absence of voluntary postdispute agreements to arbitrate in the employment arena, that
effect should disappear in business-to-business agreements.
We examined the relative frequency of pre- and post-dispute
22. According to the United States General Accounting Office, only 19% of
employers used mandatory arbitration agreements in 1997. UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’
EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (1997). Even these employers do not
use arbitration for all disputes.
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agreements to arbitrate business disputes. Again, we used the data
from the American Arbitration Association. Since AAA’s entire
business caseload would have overwhelmed our limited staff, we
selected a limited, but representative, sample of business-tobusiness cases consisting of all 2001 cases resolved by AAA’s
Somerville, New Jersey office.
In seventy-eight cases the timing of the agreement to arbitrate
could be determined. Post-dispute agreements to arbitrate were
slightly more common in this sample. In seventy-one cases (91%)
the agreement to arbitrate was entered into before the dispute
arose. In only seven cases (9%) was the agreement to arbitrate
made post dispute.
Timing of Agreement
Pre-dispute
Post-dispute
91%
9%
As with the employment data, we also conducted an automated
analysis of all AAA business-to-business arbitrations for the year
2002. This showed that only 1.8% of such disputes were the result
of post-dispute agreements. The remainder, over 98%, were the
result of pre-dispute agreements.
Timing of Agreement
Pre-Dispute
Post-Dispute
98.2%
1.8%
Again, it is impossible to completely reconcile the 9% and the
1.8% rates of post-dispute agreements from these two analyses. In
light of the fact that the second analysis included the entire set of
AAA business-to-business arbitrations, the correct answer is
probably closer to 1.8% than 9%.
No matter how one interprets this data, however, one point is
indisputable. Eliminating the element of power imbalances does
not significantly increase the rate of post-dispute arbitrations. Postdispute agreements to arbitrate employment disputes are rare, and
would continue to be rare even in the absence of power
imbalances.
While the data does not support the argument that postdispute arbitration will provide access to justice for those who need
it, this alone does not prove that my hypothesis is correct. An
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unwilling defense counsel is only one of many possible reasons why
post-dispute arbitrations seldom occur. Even if one assumes that
unwilling defense counsel is the explanation, economic hardball is
not the only reason why they might decline to arbitrate. To
completely understand the situation, one has to go behind the
numbers and ask management employment lawyers about the
reasons for their behavior.
We therefore interviewed twenty management employment
23
lawyers. Each of these individuals is a member of the American
Bar Association’s Committee on Employee Rights and
Responsibilities or the Montgomery County (Pennsylvania) Bar
Association’s Committee on Dispute Resolution. These attorneys
come from both large and small firms in all parts of the country.
The selection process, however, was not sufficiently sophisticated to
consider this group a random sample that is representative of all
management employment lawyers for statistical purposes.
Therefore, only dramatic trends in the responses are meaningful.
V. RARITY OF POST-DISPUTE ARBITRATION
The first insight revealed by these interviews was a
confirmation of the rarity of voluntary post-dispute employment
arbitration. Not one of these twenty attorneys had ever been
involved in such arbitration. Plaintiffs’ counsel had not offered
them this option.
The selected attorneys were very forthcoming on how they
would respond if given the opportunity to arbitrate an employment
claim in the absence of a previous agreement to arbitrate. Their
responses were not monolithic. While the list of factors they
considered was relatively short, attorneys found different factors to
be most influential in their decision-making. In some cases, a few
attorneys found that the presence of a certain factor led them
toward arbitration while other attorneys found the same factor a
reason to litigate. Some strong patterns did emerge from these
23. Our initial plan was to collect data using a questionnaire, an appropriate
tool for collecting information from a large sample of people. We drafted a
questionnaire and reviewed it with both academics and members of the target
audience. Both found it confusing. Several attempts to clarify the questions were
unsuccessful, and later consultation with a professional polling firm revealed that
the information we sought was too conceptual and nuanced to be captured in a
paper instrument. At this point, we decided to use personal interviews, which
would allow us to probe more deeply and clarify when the interviewee did not
understand the question.
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interviews, however.
A. Pre-trial Motions
The strongest pattern was the unwillingness of management
counsel to arbitrate when there is an opportunity to prevail on a
pre-trial motion. All but one of the twenty attorneys interviewed
(95%) were not interested in arbitration if they believed the case
could be won on a pre-trial motion. While most believed
arbitration was less expensive than litigation, they also believed the
reduced cost of litigating only through pre-trial motions would be
lower than the cost of arbitrating the dispute. They did not believe,
however, that they could resolve disputes through pre-trial motions
for summary judgment. This belief is correct; recent research
confirms that summary judgment is virtually non-existent in
24
arbitration.
Nor were these management attorneys concerned about their
ability to identify the specific cases in which a motion would be
successful. The relative clarity of the legal rules for granting
motions played some part in this confidence. A larger factor was
the known track records of individual judges. One response
referred to a judge who had never denied a single employer’s
motion for summary judgment in over two decades on the bench.
In most cases, those we interviewed preferred to litigate via
motion even if they had to complete discovery and proceed by
summary judgment. One attorney, however, would decline to
arbitrate only if the case could be won on a motion to dismiss.
This factor alone would lead to the rejection of the majority of
employee offers to arbitrate existing disputes. Currently, 60% of
employee suits against their employers are lost on summary
25
judgment. Employers’ counsels’ unwillingness to arbitrate any
case that they can win on summary judgment leaves slightly less
than half of employees seeking to arbitrate with any chance of
proceeding with arbitration.

24. Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment
Disputes in Arbitration, in HOW ADR WORKS 915, 921 (Norman Brand ed. 2002). In
this study, the author examined all AAA employment cases for the year 2000 for
which there is a published opinion. There are 163 such cases. Not one of these
was decided by summary judgment.
25. Maltby, supra note 3, at 47.
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B. Economic Hardball
My initial concern was that employees with garden-variety
claims, those not cost-effective for the private bar to litigate, might
find their employers unwilling to arbitrate. Why should employers
agree to arbitrate, and perhaps lose, when they could make the
dispute disappear by saying “no” to arbitration?
This factor turned out to have less impact than anticipated. A
majority of those we interviewed said they would be influenced by a
would-be plaintiff’s apparent financial inability to maintain
litigation. It was not, however, a large majority. Of the twenty
management lawyers, eleven (55%) would consider financial
resources if the employee was represented by counsel. Slightly
more, thirteen (65%), did so if the employee was pro se.
The other lawyers felt quite differently. Many expressed the
view that, no matter what the apparent economics, a determined
employee would ultimately find a lawyer who would take the case.
Similarly, many were reluctant to ignore even the least established
attorney with the fewest financial resources. To these management
attorneys, Erin Brockovich26 is alive and well and they do not want
to take a chance on meeting her. Even if the pro se employee
never obtained an attorney, the management attorneys believed
there could still be a cause for concern. These attorneys believed
that many employees are sufficiently angry, or need the money
badly enough, to litigate without counsel. They also believe the
judge in such a case would help the employee through the system
so that the case would be heard on the merits.
One attorney refused to engage in economic hardball out of
principle. This person believed it was a misuse of the legal process
to use such economic leverage and something that he was not
willing to engage in.
C. Incendiary Facts
The attorneys we spoke to frequently mentioned one situation
in which they would prefer to arbitrate. This was the existence of
facts (or reasonable allegations), probably admissible, which could
cause the trier of fact to be prejudiced against the employer.
26. Erin Brockovich’s investigation of exposure to toxic chemicals resulted in
the largest toxic tort injury settlement in U.S. history: $330 million in damages
paid to 600 California residents. Erin Brockovich-Ellis biography at http://www.
maasryvititoe.com/erin_brockovich.shtml (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
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Eighty percent (80%) of the lawyers we interviewed preferred to
arbitrate under these circumstances. They believed arbitrators are
more likely to keep negative facts in perspective and to avoid
emotional decisions than juries.
Four attorneys, however, were largely unaffected by the
presence of such facts. One attorney preferred to litigate when
there are bad facts. He believed if the facts’ probative value is
outweighed by the prejudice they would cause, a judge will grant a
motion in limine. Even the risk of having the motion denied did
not change his opinion. Unlike the others, he believed that
arbitrators would be prejudiced almost as much as a jury. The
other three did not prefer to litigate in these circumstances, but
also did not believe that difficult facts require them to arbitrate.
They chose to litigate or arbitrate based on other factors.
D. Clients
The attorney, of course, does not make the final decision on
whether to accept an offer to arbitrate. The employer must also
27
agree. In some situations, gaining the employer’s agreement
might be little more than a formality when the decision is a matter
of professional expertise, and the employer trusts the attorney’s
professional judgment.
Arbitration is different. Many employers view this as a matter
of corporate policy. They consider their attorney’s opinion, but
make the decision themselves. The lawyers we spoke with
confirmed that many of their clients have strong views on
arbitration that trump the recommendation of counsel when they
differ. Of these lawyers, 30% considered their employer-clients
opposed to arbitration and unlikely to agree to arbitrate even if this
counsel so advised. The other 70% varied as to their client’s
response to arbitration. Some clients are strongly pro-arbitration,
some are strongly opposed, and some decide based on the
circumstances of the individual case.
One factor that frequently came up in our discussions is the
reluctance of many clients to evaluate their cases pragmatically in
the beginning of a dispute. The same dynamic that makes clients
27. There are some situations in which a corporate client authorizes the
attorney to make specific decisions. This is generally rare, however, and there is
no reason to believe that the decision on whether to arbitrate is an exception.
None of the attorneys we interviewed believed that their clients would delegate
this decision.
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refuse to consider settlement at the beginning of a case often leads
them to refuse to arbitrate.
Beyond these general attitudes about arbitration, employers
also may view the economic leverage issue discussed earlier
differently than their attorneys. None of the attorneys we spoke
with had conducted even the most rudimentary cost-benefit
analysis. None knew how frequently a crusading lawyer takes on a
case that is not financially viable. Nor did they know how often a
pro se employee manages to litigate a case. At best, their
perception of every dispute as a significant risk is an unquantified
belief based upon experience. At worst, it is a manifestation of the
risk averse nature of management counsel.
Corporate attorneys have a long history of great concern over
minor risks. For example, they are extremely concerned about the
risk of liability for defamation by reference check. Yet, the actual
28
risk of liability in such situations is almost too small to measure. If
the attorney’s willingness to arbitrate rather than play hardball
comes from an exaggerated sense of caution rather than a realistic
calculation of the risks, the client may not agree. The one attorney
who refused to use economic leverage out of a sense of fair play
may also find himself overruled by his client.
It is important to note that attorneys are required to tell their
clients about their belief that the would-be plaintiff (with or
without counsel) is financially unable to pursue litigation. Rule 1.4
of the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct requires an attorney to
review all important aspects of a matter with the client in order for
the client to make informed decisions regarding the
29
representation. In another paragraph, the Rule requires the
30
attorney to “provide the client with facts relevant to the matter.”
The other party’s ability to pursue a lawsuit is clearly an important
point that is relevant to the client’s decision. This clear-cut reading
of Rule 1.4 is supported by no less an authority than Professor
31
Stephen Gillers, the dean of American legal ethics.

28. Terry Ann Halbert & Lewis L. Maltby, Reference Check Gridlock: A Proposal
for Escape, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’ Y J. 395, 403 (1998).
29. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1983).
30. Id. at cmt. [1].
31. E-mail from Prof. Stephen Gillers, Vice Dean, New York University School
of Law, to Lewis L. Maltby (Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with author).
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VI. ANALYSIS
However ideal it may sound in theory, the data strongly
suggests that enforcing only post-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employee disputes will not work well in practice. To be sure,
employees with a strong case and several hundred thousand dollars
in potential damages may be better off without such an agreement
because they will preserve their right to a jury trial.
In the vast majority of cases, however, litigation is not costjustified. These employees need arbitration to receive justice. The
data on post-dispute arbitrations, however, strongly suggests that
employees with run-of-the-mill employment disputes will find their
employers unwilling to arbitrate. Despite ample opportunity,
employers seldom agree to post-dispute arbitration today. Less
than one in ten employment arbitrations today is the result of a
32
post-dispute agreement.
This is not a reflection of power
imbalances that might be eliminated by a “post-dispute voluntary
rule.” In business-to-business arbitration, where parties generally
have comparable bargaining power, the rate of post-dispute
33
agreements is no higher.
Interviews with management employment attorneys
demonstrated that the reluctance of employers and their attorneys
to arbitrate is the source of these low numbers. Some attorneys
were simply adverse to arbitration generally.
Virtually all
management attorneys we spoke to would not arbitrate where the
case could be resolved in court on pre-trial motions. Others
refused to arbitrate if they believed the employee could not afford
to pursue litigation. And even when the attorney would choose to
arbitrate, the client often says no. The end result of changing the
law so that only post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are
enforceable might well be that most employees with legitimate
claims would receive no justice at all.
This does not mean that we must accept the current regime of
arbitration as a condition of employment. There are other
alternatives that deserve serious consideration. The first is predispute voluntary agreements. After a new employee is hired, she
generally fills out a number of forms. Many of these involve
choices on the employee’s part, such as which of several medical
plan options the employee prefers. An employer could provide a
32.
33.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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form at this time allowing the employee to choose between the
employer’s arbitration system and maintaining their existing right
to litigate for future disputes.
Such a system would work well in practice. The employee
would already have been hired, but would not have had time to
begin performing the job. The lack of job performance data would
make it almost impossible for an employer to escape liability if it
terminated the employee for making the “wrong” choice.
Concerns about more subtle retaliation could be addressed by
maintaining these forms in a secure location where they would not
34
be accessible to line management.
The newest alternative, first discussed at the 2003 meeting of
the American Bar Association’s Section on Dispute Resolution, is
for employers to maintain an arbitration system, but to allow
35
employees to opt out at the time of employment. While such a
system is not as respectful of employee choice as the former
alternative, it does have much to recommend it. Traditional
discussion of employment arbitration assumes that employees have
a preference for maintaining their traditional legal remedies and
that employers use their financial muscle to force them to accept
arbitration.
This model is highly suspect. Most employees start a new
employment relationship with enthusiasm and optimism, somewhat
like a honeymoon. Future difficulties are the farthest thing from
the employee’s mind. Even if an employee were asked whether she
prefers to arbitrate or litigate potential future disputes, it is unlikely
she would have a preference, especially in light of the fact that most
people know very little about either employment arbitration or

34. It is possible senior management could still obtain access to these dispute
resolution choice forms. However, it does not appear that this would often occur.
Human resources professionals have a professional ethos that requires proper
management of private employee data. If HR professionals were forced to choose
between doing the right thing and keeping their jobs, most would capitulate (as
would any other professional). Such a threat, however, could only be made by
someone who outranked the head of HR. In most companies, only a handful of
very senior executives could meet this criterion. Anecdotal evidence (primarily
from the field of medical information) suggests that while HR executives are
occasionally strong-armed, this happens only on the rare occasion where a very
senior manager believes that they have a compelling financial need for the
employee information. In the absence of a pending dispute, this situation would
not exist.
35. Audiotape: American Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution 2003
Meeting, San Antonio, Texas (Mar. 21, 2003) (on file with author).
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litigation.
In a situation where most people have not thought about what
they want, the perspective of default position analysis is very useful.
Instead of pretending that employees know what they want, admit
that most of them do not and select a default position that
represents what most people would choose if they were to make an
informed decision.
The literature on relative outcomes of employment arbitration
and litigation consistently shows that employees as a whole receive
36
more in arbitration than litigation. Under these circumstances,
the correct default position may well be arbitration. Employees
who have a preference for litigation could freely choose that
option.
These are only two possible models for voluntary pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate. Others are waiting to be discovered.
VII. CONCLUSION
Changing the law to enforce only post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate will not solve the problems of arbitration as a condition of
employment. This change would leave the majority of employees
who need arbitration in order to obtain justice empty handed,
which is a situation far worse than the one employees face today.
Rather than change from one unacceptable option to another,
models for voluntary pre-dispute arbitration agreements need to be
further developed.

36.
922.

Hill, supra note 3; Maltby, supra note 3, at 48; Maltby, supra note 24, at
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